In a new look at perhaps the two most powerful men on the planet in their time, Susan Butler (editor of MY DEAR MR. STALIN: The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin) reveals the secret deals, private thoughts and chess-like precision of geopolitics.

Franklin D. Roosevelt cleverly courted Joseph Stalin, the “man of steel” whose ism was creeping dangerously close to the world’s center stage. Maintaining the overarching thesis that America was the dominant power, Roosevelt was the consummate political poker player. According to Butler, the aristocratic American was the only world leader who the Russian cobbler’s son genuinely respected. During the exhausting negotiations in Tehran before the US entered World War II, and with the mutual goal of destroying Hitler and Nazism, both men made compromises, their full motives rarely disclosed. Roosevelt was enacting his conviction that “the time to make postwar plans was before the fighting ended,” mapping a world governmental body to be called the United Nations. Stalin wanted to be sure Russia was part of that, even if in practice their nations would never agree on any unifying policy. At one point, “Stalin asked whether the recommendations of this body would be binding on all the nations of the world. Roosevelt replied, ‘Yes and no.’”

"What Butler...abundantly demonstrates is the resolve of America’s longest serving president, who pushed on despite crisis after giant crisis, and, from Tehran to Yalta, unflinchingly matched Stalin ploy for ploy."

Roosevelt continually pressed Stalin to hold elections in Poland and elsewhere. Yet he knew that America’s European immigrants would never trust Russia, elections or no, and he had precious little support on the issue from his ally, Winston Churchill, who myopically refused to consider self-rule for Britain’s colonies. For his part, Stalin paid lip service to the notion, perhaps because, as Butler speculates, he egotistically imagined that subjugated people like the Poles would enthusiastically opt for his leadership. Roosevelt’s willingness to partner with Russia paid off when America entered the war and Stalin agreed to oppose the Japanese. Many believe that had Roosevelt lived longer, the Cold War might have been averted, because he was the one Western influence to tame the Russian Bear. Stalin praised him posthumously, calling him “a far-sighted and liberal leader who prolonged the life of capitalism.”

Butler’s book provides many small details that keep this dense narrative flowing: Roosevelt’s private sexual escapades (or rumors thereof), his dreams of being the first secretary-general of the United Nations, Stalin’s endless toasts, and the eerie sidebar that whenever Siberia was mentioned, the Russian dictator compulsively began doodling pictures of wolves.

Stalin’s motivations were nearly always suspect, and Roosevelt, as drawn by Butler, never fully trusted him, even as he sought to corner the Russian with flattery and the appearance of straight talk. What Butler also abundantly demonstrates is the resolve of America’s longest serving president, who pushed on despite crisis after giant crisis, and, from Tehran to Yalta, unflinchingly matched Stalin ploy for ploy.